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LIABILITY FOR DIVIDED PERFORMANCE OF

PROCESS CLAIMS AFTER BMC RESOURCES,
INC. V. PA YMENTECH, L.P.
I. INTRODUCTION

What constitutes infringement of another's patented invention?1
In the United States, the law of patent infringement was originally
developed by the federal courts as a matter of common law.' In
1952, however, as part of a major recodification of the patent law,
Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271 to govern patent infringement,3
and this provision remains the primary statute regulating
enforcement of patent rights to this day. Section 271 has been
subject to many amendments 4 since its enactment-while the
original provision consisted of four relatively brief subsections, the
current provision has nine subsections, some quite lengthy.'
1. One patent scholar has characterized the scope of infringement as the

"most important issue in intellectual property." Donald S. Chisum, The Scope
of Protectionfor Patents After the Supreme Court's Warner-Jenkinson Decision:
The Fair Protection-CertaintyConundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &

L.J. 1, 5 (1998) ("[G]iven that an intellectual property right exists,
to what does it extend?").
2. See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of
1952, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 521 (1953). Judge, then Professor, Rich
served as a member of the committee which assisted in drafting the legislation
that eventually became the Patent Act of 1952. Id.
3. While Congress had previously been "content" with merely governing the
creation of the patent right, "the 162-year experiment of getting along without a
statute covering [infringement] ha[d] not worked out very well." Id. at 521-22.
Judge Rich explains in his article that one of the primary purposes of the new §
271 was to properly balance the competing, and often conflicting, judiciallycrafted doctrines of contributory infringement and patent misuse to ensure that
legitimate patent rights were enforceable and the patent grant retained its power
as an incentive to innovate. See id. at 522.
4. See generally Kristin E. Gerdelman, Comment, Subsequent Performance
of Process Steps by Different Entities: Time to Close Another Loophole in U.S.
PatentLaw, 53 EMORY L.J. 1987, 1993-2003 (2004) (discussing the "evolution
of infringement liability" since 1952).
5. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(i) (2006) with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(d)
(1952).
HIGH TECH.
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Congress made many of these amendments to close perceived
"loopholes" in the law of infringement, 6 ensuring that a patentee
was not improperly deprived of the right to exclude by "artful
competitor[s]" who exploited technicalities in § 271 's provisions.7
The evolution of the law of patent infringement, and possibly of
§ 271, is not complete. Current infringement jurisprudence fails to
adequately protect the property rights of patentees whose valid
process claims cover steps which can easily be divided between
multiple entities or which must necessarily be performed by a
group of users.8 Process claims covering computer network
operations and business methods, especially those conducted over
the internet, provide ready examples of potentially vulnerable
patents.9 Judicial interpretations of § 271 which require that every
6. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1752 n.3 (2007)
(citing Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 6286, 130 CONG. REc. 28069
(1984)).
7. "The result [of the majority's narrow reading of § 271] is unduly to reward
the artful competitor who uses another's invention in its entirety and who seeks
to profit thereby." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 53233 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's position on the proper
scope of infringement, in the context of exporting the components of a patented
invention for assembly abroad, was later ratified by Congress's addition of §
271(0. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 101,
98 Stat. 3383 (1984).
8. See infra Part II; see also Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement
Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (2005) (recognizing the lack of protection for
"divided patent claims" but arguing against extending liability to cover divided
performance of process claims by multiple entities). Courts, litigants, and
commentators have used a variety of expressions to describe such situations,
often resorting to the term "joint infringement." See Harold C. Wegner, EBusiness Patent Infringement: Questfor a DirectInfringement Claim Model 1013 (Nov. 21, 2001) (unpublished paper prepared for SOFTIC 2001 Symposium,
Toyko,
Japan),
available
at
http://www.softic.or.jp/symposium/
open.materials/lOth/en/wegner-en.pdf (noting potential confusion between
"joint infringement" and "partial infringement"). To avoid any confusion with
existing principles of joint liability for direct and indirect infringement, this
paper will use the term "divided performance" to describe situations in which
multiple entities together perform all the steps of a claimed process, but each
individual entity performs less than the entire process.
9. Lemley, supra note 8, at 256 (singling out the field of computer
networking and citing U.S. Patent No. 6,421,726 (filed Mar. 1, 1998) as an
example); Wegner, supra note 8, at 18-19 (focusing on "E-business" patents and
citing U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997) as an example); see also
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3

2

Larsen: Liability for Divided Performance of Process Claims After BMC Res
LIABILITY FOR DIVIDED PERFORMANCE
2008]

step of patented process be performed by a single actor to
constitute direct infringement severely limit the enforceability of
such process claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit's decision in BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,0
in particular, may threaten the value of patenting these inventions
by restricting infringement liability to situations where one
"mastermind" entity exercises "control or direction" over the
infringement."
By doing no more than agreeing to divide
performance of the various claimed steps amongst themselves,
multiple entities can effectively appropriate the benefits of a
patented process while completely avoiding liability for
infringement. 12
For instance, assume a patentee invents a new, useful, and
Stephen A. Becker & John R. Fuisz, Court Issues Key Business-Method Patent
Ruling, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 2008, at S2, col. I ("BMC is a decision that is
especially important for . . . [b]usiness methods, especially those that involve
electronic commerce, [which] usually involve more than one person or entity in
addition to a customer, who owns or controls the various resources needed to
carry out a transaction, such as Web servers and credit clearancehouses.").
Professors Lemley and Wegner both discuss a patent prosecution strategy of
drafting multiple independent claims to cover the process, each from the
standpoint of a single entity involved in the transaction. See Lemley, supra note
8, at 271-74; Wegner, supra note 8, at 13-16. While an important consideration
for patent prosecutors where possible, claims drafting solutions are of little or no
assistance to the holder of an issued patent or an inventor whose process meets
the statutory requirements of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness only when
claimed in terms of the interaction of multiple entities.
10. 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc denied, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4968 (Feb. 11, 2008). Judge Rader authored the opinion of the panel,
which included Judges Garjasa and Prost. A second panel of the Federal
Circuit, comprised of Judges Garjasa, Plager, and Prost, recently reaffirmed the
holding of BMC in the case of Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d
1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh'g en bane denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
25099 (Sept. 25, 2008).
11. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381. Exactly what conduct falls within the
boundaries of the "control or direction" standard recently annunciated by the
Federal Circuit is somewhat unclear. Application of the standard to the facts in
BMC, as well as several district court cases, is examined below. See infra Part
II.C.
12. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 ("This court acknowledges that the standard
requiring control or direction for a finding of joint infringement may in some
circumstances allow parties to enter into arms-length agreements to avoid
infringement.").
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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nonobvious method, comprising steps A, B, C, and D, and obtains
a patent upon the invention, which proves to be quite profitable.
As a first hypothetical,' 3 two unrelated companies, one or both
presumably being competitors of the patentee, have knowledge of
this patent 4 and desire to use or sell the patented process. Rather
than take licenses from the patentee or sink money into developing
a design-around process, these companies could simply reach an
agreement 5 to divide performance of the steps of the claimed
method. The first company might perform steps A and B, while
the second company might perform steps C and D. By so doing,
these companies can obtain the entire commercial benefit of the
patent. So long as the companies maintain a truly arms-length
relationship and neither acts merely as an agent of the other, the
companies would likely face no liability under the current law of
infringement.
A second hypothetical which this paper will consider is that of a
single entity who seeks to obtain the commercial benefit of the
13. Somewhat similar factual scenarios have arisen in case law. See, e.g.,
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680 (D. Del.
1995) (involving plaintiff who accused multiple defendants of dividing
performance of patented method for manufacturing stain resistant carpet). They
have also been previously discussed in literature. See Gerdelman, supra note 4,
at 2006-11
(discussing divided performance
cases involving a
"Company/Company Fact Pattern").
14. Concerning knowledge of the patent, this hypothetical presumes that the
companies have notice of the patent and an understanding that their aggregate
actions amount to performance of each and every step of the claimed method.
In this regard, the mental state of the parties would be similar to that of those
guilty of inducing infringement under § 271(b). See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS
Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part) ("The
requirement that the alleged infringer knew or should have known his actions
would induce actual infringement necessarily includes the requirement that he
or she knew of the patent.").
15. This agreement to divide performance may take the form of an explicit
agreement, even an express contract, but might also be a tacit, unspoken, or
implied agreement between the parties. See generally Halberstam v. Welch,
705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (collecting cases and discussing what satisfies the
requirement of an agreement for civil conspiracy law). "[C]ourts have to infer
an agreement from indirect evidence in most [] cases. . . . Factors like the
relationship between the parties' acts, the time and place of their execution, and
the duration of the joint activity influence the determination." Id. at 486.
Mutual knowledge of each other's acts would also likely be important.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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patent without triggering infringement liability by performing
substantially all the steps of a patented process and selling the
resulting intermediate to customers who will perform the
remaining step(s).' 6 Considering the same patent as above, a
company with knowledge of the claimed method 7 might perform
steps A, B, and C. The company could then sell the resulting
product or data, intending that the customer will perform step D on
the intermediate to complete the process. 8 The company might
know that the customer will perform step D as a matter of course
or might provide the customer with instructions on how to perform
the last step.' 9 If the sale between the parties constitutes a discrete,
arms-length transaction, the selling company will likely escape
liability under existing law.
The patent system should not implicitly sanction the conduct
described above by allowing such companies to avoid liability for
patent infringement. Permitting patentees to be deprived of
16. Factual scenarios close to this hypothetical have also arisen in cases. See,
e.g., Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(involving divided performance between a company and its customers), reh 'g en
banc denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25099 (Sept. 25, 2008); see also
Gerdelman, supra note 4, at 2004-06 (discussing divided performance cases
involving a "Company/Customer Fact Pattern"). While this situation may seem
to potentially overlap with the first hypothetical, an important distinction for
analytical purposes is the state of mind of the second entity involved in each
scenario. In the first hypothetical, both companies have knowledge of the patent
and of the divided performance, while in the second hypothetical, only the
selling company necessarily has knowledge of the patent and the parties'
respective partial performance. The customer in the second hypothetical may be
completely unaware of the patent or the selling company's actions.
17. Similar to the first hypothetical, the selling company here has notice of
the patent and knows or reasonably should know that the aggregate actions of
itself and the customer will amount to performance of each and every step of the
claimed method. See supra note 14.
18. This selling company's mental state is similar to that of one who would
be guilty of inducing infringement, if the customer's actions could be deemed a
direct infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b); DSUMed., 471 F.3d at 1304.
19. For example, step D may be performed as a matter of course where this
step involves routine processing of data provided by the selling company on the
customer's computer. In situations where the customer performs process step(s)
as a matter of course and/or where such performance is economically
inconsequential, the selling company will basically have appropriated the
commercial benefit of the claimed invention.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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reaping the benefits of their invention will "subvert the
Constitutional scheme of promoting 'the Progress of Science and
useful Arts' with respect to affected technologies.2" A patent
system, premised on providing incentives to inventors, will
ultimately fail its purpose if it cannot promise to provide adequate
protection for worthy advances. As Judge Rich warned in the
context of properly circumscribing the doctrine of patent misuse:
"It is essential to keep in the forefront of our thinking the fact that
a patent is a monopoly because its only value as an incentive
depends upon securing to its owner monopoly power over the
invention.... Weaken or destroy the monopoly and you weaken
or destroy the system."21 Current patent infringement liability
should be extended, either judicially or statutorily, to prevent an
entity from avoiding infringement of a patented process by doing
no more than dividing performance of the claimed steps with
either another knowledgeable entity or even an unaware customer.
Part II of this paper discusses the current infringement regime,
the Federal Circuit's decision in BMC v. Paymentech, and why the
law fails to adequately protect the holder of process claim whose
steps permit or require performance by multiple entities. A
comparison of the European doctrine of "partial infringement" is
offered in Part III. Part IV analyzes general tort law polices and
several specific tort doctrines and explains how these principles
support the policy decision to extend infringement to entities who
knowingly divide infringement. Finally, Part V considers whether
such infringement liability might be adopted either judicially or
through statutory amendment.

20. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 534 (1972)

(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8). Paraphrasing
Justice Blackmun, the Federal Circuit in BMC v. Paymentech has opened the

way to deny the holder of the process patent the benefits of his invention. See
id. at 533.
21. Rich, supra note 2, at 524. Judge Rich further described as "worst of all"
the fact that certain types of patents, due to the nature of the invention, had
become "incapable of enforcement" under the judicial interpretation of the
patent misuse doctrine. Id. "It is fraud on the public to issue such patents and

then blandly inform their owners in the midst of litigation that ... there is no
way to. . . enforce the patent." Id. at 524-25.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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II. CURRENT DOCTRINES OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT

A patent is intended to give the inventor the basic right to
prevent unauthorized persons from making, using, selling, offering
to sell, or importing the covered invention 2 for a period of twenty
years from the date of filing the application. 23 To understand the
scope of a patent and a patentee's right to exclude others from
practicing his invention, one must understand the scope of the
patent's claims. 24 Generally, the patentee may preclude others
from obtaining the benefits of a device described by his claims or a
process including the steps listed in his claims, i.e. infringing his
patent rights. Furthermore, a patentee may prevent parties from
inducing another to infringe the patent 25 or contributing to
another's infringement.2 6 Despite these seemingly broad rights,
these generalizations do not hold true for process claims when the
claimed steps are performed by multiple, independent entities
under the current patent infringement regime.27 While the first
three subparts of § 271 provide the basic framework of patent
infringement just described, these provisions cannot be fully
understood apart from several important judicial interpretations of

22. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
24. Every utility patent must "conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2006).

25. "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006).
26. "Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into
the United States

...

a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented

process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,

and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer." 35 U.S.C. §
271(c) (2006).
27. The "All Limitations" rule, the "Single Actor" rule, and the requirement
of a direct infringer, discussed immediately below, often do not pose a problem
to the patentee when multiple entities collaborate to infringe machine, article of
manufacture, or composition of matter claims. As these claims typically deal
with concrete objects (as opposed to process claims which cover temporal
events), at some point, some party will complete the assembly of the patented
device and commit an act of direct infringement.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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the statute which have evolved over time: the "All Limitations"
rule, the "Single Actor" rule, and the requirement of a direct
infringer.
A. JudicialInterpretationof Section 271: The "All Limitations"
and "Single Actor" Rules and the Requirement of Direct
Infringement
The inventor of a process comprised of steps subject to divided
performance may be deprived of the power to prevent multiple
entities from collaborating to make, use, or sell his invention by
several judicial doctrines, which can be summarized as follows:
generally, no party may be held liable for infringement until the
patentee demonstrates that each and every step of the claimed
method was performed by one, single entity. With regard to the
factual scenarios described in Part I,8 the patentee cannot make
this showing because each company which desired to obtain the
commercial benefit of the patented process has divided
performance of the claimed steps, either with another company
having similar motives or a customer willing to perform the
omitted step(s). Although every step claimed in the patent is in
fact performed, no single entity performs all the steps, and none of
the parties may be held liable as a direct or an indirect infringer.
The first important judicial interpretation of § 271 is that the
"patented invention" for purposes of direct infringement ,29 and
therefore for purposes of the patentee's right to exclude, is defined
by the claims, specifically each and every limitation of the claim
being asserted."
This doctrine, which has become known

28. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
29. "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention.... infringes the patent." § 271(a) (emphasis added).
30. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) ("Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and
every step or element of a claimed method or product."), reh 'g en banc denied,
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4968 (Feb. 11, 2008); see also Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (holding that doctrine of
equivalents analysis, like literal infringement, must be applied limitation-bylimitation to the claim). "Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed
material to defining the scope of the patented invention." Id.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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alternatively as the "All Limitations" or the "All Elements" rule,3"
is often supported by the proposition that "each element of a claim
is [considered] material and essential. 32 Although a patentee may
be provided some relief from the literal language of the claims
through the judicial doctrine of equivalents, this doctrine can only
be used to find that a particular step performed by an accused
infringer was equivalent to the claimed step it replaced.33 Thus,
under either literal infringement or the doctrine of equivalents, an
entity that practices less than each and every step, or its equivalent,
of a claimed method has not used the "patented invention."34
The "All Limitations" rule serves an important purpose in patent
law, closely related to the function and purpose of the claims
themselves. Since the Patent Act of 1870, the first to require the
patent to conclude with at least one claim, claims have served the
function of property boundaries, marking off what belonged to the
inventor as against the public.35 As such, claims are intended to
31. "IT]his court has moved towards the custom of referring to claim
'limitations,' reserving the word 'elements' for describing the parts of the
accused device, though the court on occasion continues to use the words
interchangeably." Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1015
n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
32. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (en banc) overruled in part by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc.,
508 U.S. 83. "[T]he plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its
substantial equivalent in the accused device." Id.
33. "[T]he doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of
the claim, not to the invention as a whole." Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 29.
34. "The law of this circuit is axiomatic that a method claim is directly
infringed only if each step of the claimed method is performed." Muniauction,
Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing BMC, 498
F.3d at 1378-79), reh'g en banc denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25099 (Sept.
25, 2008). "It is well established that a patent for a method or process is not
infringed unless all steps or stages of the claimed process are utilized." NTP,
Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting
Roberts Dairy Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1342, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
35. See Chisum, supra note 1, at 6 ("[N]othing can be more just and fair both
to the patentee and to the public, than that the former should understand and
correctly describe just what he has invented and for what he claims a patent."
(quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1877))); see also Rich, supra note 2,
at 526-27 ("IT]he claim ... has to define the scope of the patent monopoly so
that others may guess at what will or will not be considered an infringement
with some degree of accuracy.").
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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provide clear notice to competitors of the scope of a patentee's
right to exclude. 6 The "All Limitations" rule, by requiring that
each limitation or its equivalent be present in the accused process
or device, helps to maintain a higher degree of certainty in the
boundaries of a patentee's right.37
While the doctrine of
equivalents provides some relief from the constraints of describing
an invention using written language, allowing infringement
liability based on "equivalence" with the invention as a whole
would sufficiently breakdown the notice function of claims.38
The second important judicial interpretation of § 271 is that
"whoever," for purposes of direct infringement,39 refers to only a
single, individual entity.4" This "Single Actor" rule can be thought
of as a corollary to the "All-Limitations" rule: each and every step
of the claimed process must be performed by a single party.4 In
BMC v. Paymentech, the Federal Circuit applied this rule and
refused to aggregate the actions of multiple entities to consider
whether each and every step of the patented process had been

36. "The [patent] monopoly is a property right; and like any property right,
its boundaries should be clear.... A patent holder should know what he owns,
and the public should know what he does not." Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002).
37. In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court agreed with Judge Nies' dissent
in the Federal Circuit opinion that the application of an "All Limitations" rule
would properly balance the competing interests present in infringement analysis.
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28-29 ("We do, however, share the concern of
the dissenters below that ... the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly,
conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory
claiming requirement.").
38. Professor Chisum referred to the "All Limitations" rule as the Court's
solution to the "Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum" that results from
requiring a patentee to claim his invention in writing. Chisum, supra note 1, at
6-7.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) ("[W] hoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, . . . infringes the patent.")
(emphasis added).
40. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir.
2007), reh "gen banc denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4968 (Feb. 11, 2008).
41. Id. at 1379 ("For process patent or method patent claims, [direct]
infringement occurs when a party performs all of the steps of the process."
(citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993))
(emphasis added)).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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performed by a group of entities.42 Under the combined effect of
the "All Limitations" and "Single Actor" rules, when companies
divide performance of a method claim as described above,43 no
individual entity meets the definition of a direct infringer.
The final important judicial interpretation of § 271 involves the
provisions covering the forms of indirect infringement:
inducement and contributory infringement." These doctrines of
indirect infringement often impose liability against the "true
culprit" in patent cases, despite that party not fulfilling the tests of
direct infringement, such as the "All Limitations" rule.45 The
caveat is as follows: "[i]ndirect infringement requires, as a
predicate, a finding that some party amongst the accused actors has
committed the entire act of direct infringement."4 6 Thus, under
both hypothetical fact patterns from Part I,17 not only has each
entity escaped liability as a direct infringer, but due to that fact,
none of them may be held responsible as an indirect infringer.
Although the companies possess the knowledge and intent which
normally leads to liability for inducing infringement, they are able
to reap the commercial benefits of the patented process without
repercussion.

42. Id. at 1382 ("Paymentech did not perform or cause to be performed each
and every element of the claims. In this situation, neither the financial
institutions, the debit networks, nor the payment services provider, Paymentech,
bears responsibility for the actions of the other.").
43. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.

44. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (2006).
45. The "true culprit" being the party who seeks to facilitate infringement
and thereby profit from the invention, while avoiding liability as a direct
infringer. See Rich, supra note 2, at 527 (discussing the origins of indirect
infringement as the courts' response to "overly smart people [who] thought they

saw a way to steal inventions and avoid infringement" by selling less than the
entire invention to customers who would complete the device).
46. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1379 (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips
Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
47. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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B. Incorporationof Vicarious Responsibility: The "PrincipalAgent'"and "Some Connection " Exceptions to the "Single Actor"
Rule

Federal courts have provided

some relief from a strict

application of the "Single Actor" rule48 which would bar
infringement claims against any form of divided performance of
process claims. To avoid such harsh results, courts have adapted
common law tort principles of vicarious liability, specifically the
concept that a principal bears responsibility for the acts of his

agents.49 Under this "Principal-Agent" exception to the "Single
Actor" rule, a court will attribute the conduct of the agent(s) to the
principal, in a sense aggregating performance of the process steps
in the principal, and thereby permitting a finding of direct
infringement." Courts applying this exception have focused on
the degree of control exercised by the party asserted to be the
principal and direct infringer. 1 In BMC v. Paymentech, the
Federal Circuit affirmed this theory of liability for principals who
48. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
49. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1379 (noting that, while judicial interpretations of
§ 271 "might seem to provide a loophole for a party to escape infringement by
having a third party carry out one or more of the claimed steps on its behalf,"
courts have applied principles of agency law to find liability in some cases); see
generally Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 16.06 (discussing
application of agency law by courts to attempts by principals to avoid
infringement liability by delegating performance of certain process steps to an
agent); Sriranga Veeraraghavan, Comment, Joint Infringement of Patent
Claims: Advice for Patentees, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
211 (2006) (discussing origins and development of the "agency" theory). The

older, more traditional terminology was that of "master" and "servant."

See

220 (1958).
50. Lemley, supra note 8, at 258-59 (citing Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F.
Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. La. 1980)).
51. This focus is appropriate "[g]iven that the hallmark of an agency
relationship is 'control or [] the right of control."' Veeraraghavan, supra note
49, at 214 (second alteration in original); but cf Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace
Co., 367 F. Supp. 207, 253 (D. Conn 1973) (finding customers to be "agents"
for purposes of the exception because defendant knew the customers would
complete the final process step). The Federal Circuit in BMC v. Paymentech did
not discuss the continuing vitality of the district court's holding in Mobil Oil or
how that holding might be reconciled with the "control or direction" standard
now required for vicarious responsibility.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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"mastermind" infringement.5 2 While this exception gives relief in
some, specific factual situations, a strict application focusing on
the right to control is likely to be unavailing to the patentee
holding claims subject to divided performance between two
unrelated companies or between a seller and a buyer in a discrete
transaction. In either scenario, no one party exercises control over
the other, and most courts would not consider either party to be an
agent of the other.
Is any broader theory of relationship between the parties, beyond
that of master-servant, a permissible basis to aggregate their
actions and impose liability for direct infringement? In recent
years the answer appeared to be "yes." 53 In several cases,
sympathetic district courts had begun to expand beyond agency
principles, allowing aggregation of divided performance where
"some connection" existed between the parties. 4 Though the
exact criteria for a sufficient "connection" had not been worked
out, cases contemplated that "work[ing] in concert.., to complete
the process" and "direct contact" would support liability. 5 The
hopes of plaintiffs holding patents with divided claims were also
inflated by a statement of the Federal Circuit in On Demand
Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc.,56 that it found "no flaw
in this [jury] instruction as a statement of law":
52. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 ("A party cannot avoid infringement, however,
simply by contracting out steps of a patented process to another entity. In those
cases, the party in control would be liable for direct infringement." (emphasis
added)).
53. See Veeraraghavan, supra note 49, at 222-32 (discussing origins and
development of a broader "some connection" theory); Gerdelman, supra note 4,
at 2007-11 (same).
54. See, e.g., Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:02-CV-186, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3389, at *16-17 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2006) (aggregating acts of defendant
and customers under "some connection" theory); Applied Interact, L.L.C. v.
Vermont Teddy Bear Co., No. 04 Civ 8713(HB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070,
at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (same); Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs.,
Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987, at *15, 22-23 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 24, 1999) (coining the "some connection" language, but finding connection
"too remote" to impose liability); see also Veeraraghavan, supra note 49, at
222-32; Gerdelman, supra note 4, at 2007-11.
55. FaroudjaLabs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987, at *17, *19.
56. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
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It is not necessary for the acts that constitute
infringement to be performed by one person or
entity.
When infringement results from the
participation and combined action(s) of more than
one person or entity, they are all joint infringers and
jointly liable for patent infringement. Infringement
of a patented process or method cannot be avoided
by having another perform one step of the process
or method."7
While approval of this instruction was far from conclusive of
what relationship was required before multiple parties' actions
could be aggregated to find direct infringement, the statement
could also be read broadly to encompass the district courts' newer
test. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit recently rejected any such
"Some Connection" exception to the "Single Actor" rule in BMC
v. Paymentech and dismissed On Demand's approval of the jury
instruction as dicta.
C. The Cabining of Vicarious Responsibility in BMC v.
Paymentech
In BMC v. Paymentech, the plaintiff, BMC Resources, Inc.
("BMC"), asserted two method claims59 against one of its
competitors, Paymentech, L.P. ("Paymentech").6 ° BMC's patents
57. Id. at 1344-45.
58. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("BMC's interpretation of On Demand goes beyond settled law."), reh 'g
en banc denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4968 (Feb. 11, 2008). "[T]his court in
BMC Resources explicitly affirmed a reading of On Demand as 'not in any way
rely[ing] on the relationship between the parties."' Muniauction, Inc. v.
Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting BMC, 498 F.3d
at 1380) (alteration in original), reh'g en banc denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
25099 (Sept. 25, 2008).
59. The method claims in suit were Claim 2 of U.S. Patent No. 5,718,298
(filed Apr. 10, 1996) and Claim 7 of U.S. Patent No. 5,870,456 (filed Oct. 7,
1997).
60. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1375. BMC alleged that Paymentech both directly
infringed and induced others to infringe the-patents in suit. BMC Res., Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P., No. 3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37746, at *4
(N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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covered methods for processing debit transactions between a
merchant and a customer using a touch-tone telephone, without a
personal identification number or PIN.6 Both method claims in
suit required the combined actions of three entities: a company
offering the PIN-less debit payment service (such as BMC or
Paymentech), a debit network (such as an ATM network), and the
financial institution which had issued the debit card.62 For
purposes of summary judgment, the parties agreed both that each
step of the claimed method was in fact performed and that at least
three steps were performed not by Paymentech, but by its affiliated
debit networks and financial institutions.63 The district court
granted Paymentech's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement, finding that BMC had not shown either that any
entity "directed or controlled" the others or even "sufficient
evidence of ' a connection between Paymentech and the financial
institutions."

On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment to Paymentech and took the opportunity to
clarify the "proper standard for joint infringement by multiple
parties of a single claim."6 After reviewing the "All Limitations"
rule, the "Single Actor" rule, and the requirement of a direct
infringer, the court noted that the law also imposed vicarious
responsibility for the acts of another where "the liable party
controlledthe conduct of the acting party." 66 The court went on to
61. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1375.

62. Id.
63. The magistrate found that entities other than Paymentech performed the
following steps of the method: "(1) determining whether sufficient funds exist in
the PINless credit or debit card account, (2) charging the payment amount
against the account, and (3) adding the payment amount to the merchant's
account." BMC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37746 at * 12.
64. Id. at *22. In a "surfeit of care," the district court considered BMC's
evidence under both exceptions to the "Single Actor" rule, even though it
determined that "control or direction" was the proper legal standard. BMC, 498

F.3d at 1378.
65. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1375, 1378.

66. Id. at 1379 (citing Engle v. Dinehart, 213 F.3d 639, 2000 WL 554942, at
*9 (5th Cir. 2000) (Dennis, J., dissenting in relevant part) (unpublished
opinion)) (emphasis added). At the portion of Engle cited by the Federal

Circuit, Judge Dennis noted that "[t]he most frequently proffered justification
for imposing [vicarious] liability is that the master has the control or right to
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reject aggregation of multiple entities' divided performance under
any broader theory of connection between the entities, observing
that courts had "generally refused to find liability where one party
did not control or direct each step of the patented process."67 The
Federal Circuit also frankly acknowledged that its restriction of
vicarious responsibility to situations of control by one party might
allow companies to avoid infringement liability through the use of
arms-length agreements, but found that policy concerns weighed
against expanding liability.68 In applying these legal standards to
the facts, the court concluded that BMC had failed to show that
Paymentech controlled or directed the activity of its business
affiliates: first, Paymentech did not instruct the debit networks on
how to use the data it provided them; second, Paymentech had
little or no connection with the financial institutions who dealt
primarily with the debit networks.69
While the result in BMC v. Paymentech was arguably correct,7"
control the physical conduct of the servant in the performance of the services or
work." Engle, 2000 WL 554942, at *9 (emphasis added).
67. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380 (emphasis added). As support for this assertion,
however, the court only noted two of its precedents (neither of which had
squarely considered the issue), dictum from a Ninth Circuit opinion, and two
district court decisions (one being the opinion below and the other being the
case which coined the broader "Some Connection" exception). See id. (citing
Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (dealing with an apparatus claim); Fromson v. Advance Offset
Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (remanding on issue of
infringement after reversing claim construction); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol
Corp., 501 F.2d 282, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding one claimed step was
performed by no party); BMC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4961 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9,
2006); Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22987 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999)). The Federal Circuit did not
address any of the other district court cases which arguably relied on a broader
theory of "connection" between the entities. See Veeraraghavan, supra note 49,
at 222-32; Gerdelman, supra note 4, at 2007-11.
68. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381; see also infra Part IV.D (discussing and refuting
policy concerns which led the court to reject any broader theory of vicarious
responsibility).
69. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381-82 ("Without this direction or control of both the
debit networks and the financial institutions, Paymentech did not perform or
cause to be performed each and every element of the claims.").
70. BMC offered no evidence regarding any express or implied agreement
between the entities which divided performance of the method claims in suit or
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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the more important issue, looking forward, will be the parameters
of the test which the court annunciated. In the recent case of
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., the Federal Circuit reiterated
the "All Limitations" and "Single Actor" rules and applied the
holding of BMC v. Paymentech to determine that the acts of the
defendant, Thomson, and its customers could not be aggregated to
find a direct infringement.71 The Muniauction court stated that the
"control or direction" standard would be satisfied "in situations
where the law would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer
vicariously liable for the acts committed by [the additional
parties]."" The court concluded that controlling access to its
online bidding system and instructing customers on its use was
insufficient to impose vicarious liability, and thus liability for
direct infringement, on Thomson." To date, nine lower courts
have also had occasion to consider application of the "control or
direction" standard.74 The vast majority of these decisions have
the mental state of Defendant Paymentech. Without other facts, Paymentech
and its affiliates would not fit within the hypothetical scenarios posed by this
paper.
71. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328-30 (Fed. Cir.
2008), reh'g en banc denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25099 (Sept. 25, 2008).
Plaintiff Muniauction's asserted patents covered "electronic methods for
conducting 'original issuer auctions of financial instruments."' Id. at 1321. As
the parties agreed that no single party performed each and every step of the
asserted claims, the sole infringement issue was whether the actions of
Defendant Thomson and its customers could be combined to find a "joint
infringement." Id. at 1328-29.
72. Id. at 1330.
73. Id. at 1330 ("Muniauction has identified no legal theory under which
Thomson might be vicariously liable for the actions of the bidders. Therefore,
Thomson does not infringe the asserted claims as a matter of law.").
74. As of November 1, 2008, according to Westlaw and LEXIS online
databases, these cases include: Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., No. H-07-1798,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77597, at *24 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2008) (granting
summary judgment of non-infringement); Fisher-Barton Blades, Inc. v. Blount,
Inc., No. 05-C-460, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92372, at *22 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30,
2008) (denying summary judgment of non-infringement); Rowe Int'l Corp. v.
Ecast, Inc., No. 06 C 2703, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75327, at *132 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 25, 2008) (denying summary judgment of non-infringement); Global
Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, No. 08-80013-CIV, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 61697, at *11-12 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2008) (granting motion to
dismiss due to non-infringement); Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo, Inc., No. 02-C-736, 2008
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focused on common law agency principles and the element of
control or the right to control by one party, which the Federal
Circuit so heavily emphasized." 5
So long as the courts continue to stress a requirement that one
party

control

or

direct

the

others,

or

"mastermind"

the

infringement, liability will not be imposed in either of the factual
scenarios posed in Part 1.76 With regard to the first hypothetical of

two companies reaching an agreement to divide performance of a
claimed method, the relationship of these entities resembles that of
a joint venture or a conspiracy,77 but not the common law
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35944, *29 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2008) (denying defendant's
JMOL motion on the issue of infringement); Zinus, Inc. v. Simmons Bedding
Co., No. C 07-3012 PVT, 2008 WL 682858 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2008)
(denying summary judgment of non-infringement); Privasys, Inc. v. Visa Int'l,
No. C 07-03257 SI, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86838, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14,
2007) (allowing plaintiff to amend complaint with evidence of control or
direction); TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561, 575 (E.D. Tex.
2007) (denying defendant's JMOL motion on the issue of infringement);
Gammino v. Cellco P'ship, 527 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (granting
summary judgment of non-infringement).
75. See Emtel, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77597, at *38-82 (relying heavily on
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY and case law to find that physicians
could not be considered agents of the primary defendant); Fisher-BartonBlades,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92372, at *36-40 (noting that defendant hired third party
to manufacture blades to certain specifications); Rowe Int'l, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75327, at *10-15 (noting that Ecast acted as a "mastermind" in
controlling the other defendants' manufacturing of jukebox hardware); Global
Patent Holdings, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61697, at *10-11 ("Defendant may
give home users the keys to the truck, but home users have no obligation to use
those keys to start the truck and drive away."); Alloc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35944, at *28-29 (finding reasonable basis for jury verdict that providing
instructions to users did not amount to "control"); Privasys, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 86838, at *8 ("[P]laintiff may well be able to put forth facts showing
that defendant ...

controlled the conduct of other parties.") (emphasis added);

TGIP, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 578 (discussing testimony that third party "acted on
behalf of' defendant); Gammino, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 398 (ruling that there was
"no evidence that Davel controlledhow the local providers went about blocking
intemational calls") (emphasis added); but cf Zinus, 2008 WL 682858 at *3-4
(focusing on proximate causation and emphasizing that accused infringer
provided instructions to customer on performing last step of claimed method).
76. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
77. While this relationship of joint venturers or co-conspirators ought to
provide an adequate legal basis for aggregating the actions of the entities and
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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principal-agent relationship emphasized in BMC v. Paymentech.
A finding of control or direction also seems unlikely between a

selling company and its customers in most circumstances,
particularly after the Federal Circuit's holding in Muniauction v.
Thomson that controlling access to an online system and

instructing customers on its use was insufficient for direct
infringement."7

If liability should be imposed upon entities who

seek to reap the commercial benefit of another's patented process
and avoid liability simply by exploiting the technicalities of

infringement jurisprudence, an approach broader than the "control
or direction" standard of BMC v. Paymentech is needed.
III. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO "PARTIAL INFRINGEMENT"

When considering infringement liability for entities which
individually practice less than each and every step of a claimed
method, one might examine the approaches of other patent
systems. In contrast to the United States' requirements for direct
infringement, many foreign patent systems, notably several

member countries of the European Patent Convention ("EPC"),
allow patentees to recover against entities who practice less than
the entire patented claims, but nevertheless appropriate the
commercial benefit of the invention.79 These systems refer to
imposing infringement liability, as argued below, see infra Part IV, the basis for
imposing vicarious responsibility is distinct from that of common law agency.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 19, 154
F.3d 137, 143 n.9 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that although several entities could be
considered joint venturers under partnership jurisprudence, "they were not
agents pursuant to common law principles of agency law"). Given BMC v.
Paymentech's emphasis on "control," the hallmark of common law agency, it
cannot be assumed that the decision would also cover vicarious responsibility
based on joint venture or conspiracy law.
78. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330.
79. See Jochen Pagenberg, The Scope of Art. 69 European Patent
Convention: Should Sub-Combinations Be Protected ? - A Comparative
Analysis on the Basis of French and German Law, 24 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 314 (1993) (discussing infringement liability for defendants
who practice less than the entire claimed invention). In addition to Article 69
EPC, protection against "partial infringement" is also allowed under
Community Patent Convention art. 26, Dec. 15, 1975, 15 I.L.M. 5. R. CARL
MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS, § 15:14 (4th ed. 2007).
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these theories generally as "partial infringement,"8 and impose
liability where the accused entity has "employed the substance of
the patentee's technological advance, even though one or more of81
the elements nominally stated in the claim has been omitted.
Application of such a theory to the posed hypothetical scenarios
could be used to hold one of the companies liable as a direct
infringer if that company's partial performance amounted to an
appropriation of the "substance" of the patented process.82 While
possibly attractive on the surface, reliance on European partial
infringement theories would sufficiently erode the notice function
of patent claims protected by the "All Limitations" rule83 and,
ultimately, is unneeded to address the problem of entities who
divide infringement.
Theories of partial infringement abroad revolve around a starkly
different application of the doctrines of equivalents. While
recognition of non-literal infringement is driven by very similar
concerns to those United States law,84 EPC countries look to
"equivalence" between the accused device or process and the
claimed invention, as a whole: "Protection is to be granted, if at
least a majority of the essential features are reproduced in a way
that the inventive result as disclosed in the patent is still being
achieved."85 This "inventive result" concept is reminiscent of
looking to the "heart" or "gist" of an invention, a concept which
has long been disavowed in U.S. patent law.86 This discrepancy in
80. In the French patent law, it is called "contrefaqon partielle." Pagenburg,
supra note 79, at 314. Inthe German patent law, it is known as "Teilschutz."
(partial protection). Id. at 333.
81. MOY, supra note 79.
82. In addition, once a "direct infringer" was found, the other participating
party could be held liable as an indirect infringer, where appropriate based on
the facts.
83. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. The Doctrine of
Equivalents and the "All Limitations" rule balance the ideas of giving "fair
protection" to the patentee and providing the public with fair notice of the
patentee's property rights. Chisum, supra note 1, at 6-7.
84. Pagenberg discusses a similar tension between the notice function of
claims and equitable treatment of the patentee: the answer, "Bad claim drafting,
that's your problem," to the patentee seeking protection provides clarity, but is
not fair or just. Pagenburg, supra note 79, at 332-33.
85. Id. at 335.
86. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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non-literal infringement theories can be traced to the historical
practice of central claiming87 in many European countries, while
the United States has for more than a century employed a system
of peripheral claiming,88 which lent itself to development of the
"All Limitations" rule to protect the notice function of claims.
In light of the fundamental differences between these
approaches, incorporation of some version of partial infringement
as practiced by several EPC countries would be problematic
because it would require an abandonment of the "All Limitations"
rule. Furthermore, partial infringement and reliance on a concept
such as the "heart" of the invention is not needed to hold parties
who divide performance of a patented process jointly liable for
infringement. Rather, retaining the "All Limitations" rule but
relaxing the "Single Actor" rule, as courts have already done in the
principal-agent context,89 would provide the better solution for
U.S. patent law. Aggregating the actions of entities who divide
performance of a patented process, in appropriate circumstances,
would provide a basis for imposing liability without eroding the
notice function of claims.

336 (1961).
[T]his Court has made it clear in the two Mercoid
cases that there is no legally recognizable or
protected "essential" element, "gist" or "heart" of the
invention in a combination patent .... "The patent is
for a combination only. Since none of the separate
elements of the combination is claimed as the
invention, none of them when dealt with separately is
protected by the patent monopoly."
Id. at 345 (quoting Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667
(1944)).
87. "Central claiming" typically employs one claim which references the
specification and claims the invention "constructed and arranged substantially in
the manner and for the purposes set forth." See JANICE M. MUELLER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 54 (2d ed. 2006).
88. "Peripheral claiming" sets forth the "metes and bounds" of the claimed
invention, similar to boundaries in a deed to real property. Id.
89. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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IV. TORT LAW THEORIES WHICH FAVOR LIABILITY FOR DIVIDED
PERFORMANCE

Infringement of a patent has long been considered a form or
species of tort.9" The peripheral claims Of a patent can be
conceptualized as marking of the boundaries of the inventor's
property '-as such, infringement can be roughly analogized to
That an
interference with or a taking of that property.9"
infringement action has other features generally applicable to torts
is confirmed by the existence of indirect infringement, which is
"an expression of the old common law doctrine of joint
tortfeasors."93 Concepts and policies from the larger body of tort
law thus lend themselves as naturally to be examined when
considering liability for multiple entities whose combined actions
appropriate the benefit of a patentee's claimed invention. General
tort law policies, 9" which focus on harm to the plaintiff, as well as
the tort law concepts of civil conspiracy 95 and combined
nuisance, 96 support the imposition of liability on an entity who
90. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Garjasa, J., concurring) (recognizing infringement as a tort, albeit a unique tort
defined by statutory provisions). "[P]atent infringement claims may be viewed
as species of tort claims ....

."

Id.

91. Seesupra note 88.
92. See Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th
Cir. 1897) ("An infringement of a patent is a tort analogous to trespass or
trespass on the case. From the earliest times, all who take part in a trespass,
either by actual participation therein or by aiding and abetting it, have been held
to be jointly and severally liable for the injury inflicted.... If this healthful rule
is not to apply to trespass upon patent property, then, indeed, the protection
which is promised by the constitution and laws of the United States to inventors
is a poor sham.").
93. Rich, supra note 2, at 525. See also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 500 ("It is true that a contributory infringer is a
species of joint-tortfeasor, who is held liable because he has contributed with
another to the causing of a single harm to the plaintiff."). The term "joint tort"
had its origin in Sir John Heydon's Case, (1612) 11 Coke 5 (Eng.), and was
used to describe "the situation where two or more defendants acted in concert
for the accomplishment of a common design." Roy D. Jackson, Jr., Joint Torts
and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REv. 399, 403 (1939).
94. See infra Part IV.A.
95. See infra Part IV.B.
96. See infra Part IV.C.
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seeks to exploit the technicalities of infringement jurisprudence by
dividing performance of a claimed method with another entity or
customer. The ultimate question of patent law policy ought to be
balanced in favor of protecting patentees in such situations.
A. General Tort Law Policies and the "PrimaFacie Tort"
Doctrine
The primary functions of tort law-compensating victims who
have been harmed and deterring undesirable conduct 9 7-support a
finding of infringement liability for entities who divide
performance, such as those described in Part I's hypothetical
scenarios. 98 Between two inventors whose patents both contain
valid method claims, the inventor holding claims whose
performance may be easily divided or whose performance
necessarily requires a multitude of actors, should have no less of a
right to exclude others from practicing his invention than the
inventor holding claims which would be enforceable under the
current judicial interpretations of § 271. From another perspective,
a patentee holding valid process claims is no less harmed when
multiple, unauthorized entities divide performance of the claimed
steps and reap the economic benefits of the invention than when a
single direct infringer uses the patented process without
permission. Tort law's focus on harm done to victims would
encourage redress to the patentee regardless of whether one or
multiple entities performed the steps of the claimed method.
Tort law's emphasis on deterring intentional infliction of harm
also responds the argument that entities who seek to exploit
"loopholes" in the current infringement regime by dividing
performance should not held liable because they have only
engaged in conduct implicitly sanctioned by the patent law. An
influential theory of tort law is the "prima facie tort" doctrine:
regardless of recognized causes of action, "intentionally to do that

97. Paul Bargren, Comment, Joint and Several Liability: Protection for
Plaintiffs, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 453, 462 (1994) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER &
JOHN W. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1 (8th ed. 1988); Richard
Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CAL. L. REv. 917, 917 n.1

(1985)).
98. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
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which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and
which does, in fact, damage another in that person's property or
trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse." 99 This
doctrine has been used to provide remedies where none would
otherwise exist and functions as a unifying principle of tort law. 100
The companies of the introductory hypotheticals who seek to
exploit a patentee's claimed method but avoid infringement
through divided performance should not escape liability for
intentionally taking the property claimed in the patent. Under the
prima facie tort doctrine, the damage done to the patentee's
property and trade should be actionable.
B. The Tort Law Concept of Civil Conspiracy
Although a great deal of disagreement exists on whether the tort
law concept civil conspiracy functions as a stand-alone substantive
tort or merely as a doctrine of joint and several liability,'' the
concept in either form supports imposing liability on the
companies of the first hypothetical" 2 who agree to divide
performance of a patented process in an attempt to avoid
infringement. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "one
is subject to liability if he does a tortious act in concert with

99. Jerry Whitson, Civil Conspiracy: A Substantive Tort?, 59 B.U. L. REV.
921, 944 (1979) (quoting Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., 23 Q.B.D.

598, 613 (1889)).
100. See id. ("Some authorities ... have argued that any intentional infliction
of harm should subject the actor to liability if he cannot justify his conduct.")
(citing Robert L. Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance,46
COLUM. L. REV. 196, 210 (1946); Oliver W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and
Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1894)).
101. Id. at 921 ("Whether conspiracy should exist as an independent tort is a

question which has caused considerable confusion during this century, inspiring
one commentator to call the subject 'one of the most elusive concepts in
American tort law . .. ."'(quoting BOSTON COLLEGE COLLEGE OF LAW, 1954
ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW

39, 40 (William J. Curran ed.,

1955)).
102. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. The tort law concept of
civil conspiracy would not be applicable to the second hypothetical, see supra
notes 16-19 and accompanying text, as no agreement is formed between the
selling company and its customer(s).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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[another] or pursuant to a common design with him."' 3 In
summarizing the law of civil conspiracy, a distinguished panel of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described its
elements as follows:
(1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2)
to participate in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in
an unlawful manner; (3) an injury caused by an
unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties
to the agreement; (4) which overt act was done
pursuant 4to and in furtherance of the common
0

scheme. 1

While an agreement is an essential element of any conspiracy,' 5
the law of criminal conspiracy, which punishes the mere
agreement to attempt a crime, can be contrasted with civil
conspiracy, which focuses on whether damage is in fact done to
the plaintiff.'06 In the posed hypothetical, the patentee has suffered
the requisite damage when the companies, pursuant to their
"common design," perform each and every step of his claimed
'
method. 07
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1979).
104. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, Bork,
and Scalia, JJ.). The odd phrasing of element (2) is sometimes thought to
represent the two different forms of the doctrine. Conspiracy to "participate in
an unlawful act" being the joint liability rule, and conspiracy "to participate in..
. a lawful act in an unlawful manner" being the substantive tort. See Thomas J.
Leach, Civil Conspiracy: What's the Use?, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1999).
105. While the element of an agreement is "key," it need not be shown that
the agreement was explicit: "[p]roof of a tacit, as opposed to explicit,
understanding is sufficient to show agreement." Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477
(citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 292 (4th ed.
1971); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conspiracy § 68 (1979)) (finding tacit agreement
between the defendants based on circumstantial evidence).
106. See Whitson, supra note 99, at 924. Whitson explains that while
criminal conspiracy allows for punishment based on the agreement itself, even if
the crime is uncompleted, civil conspiracy is only actionable if the plaintiff
suffers damage as a result of the defendants' agreement and actions, following
the general tort law policy of redressing actual harms done. Id.
107. See supra Part IV.A.
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The difference between the two views of civil conspiracy is
whether the overt act done in furtherance of the conspiracy must
itself constitute an independent tort."'8 If so, civil conspiracy
functions primarily as a rule of joint and several liability-the
person who committed the overt act would otherwise be liable in
tort, but his act is attributed to all co-conspirators, creating joint
liability." °9 If the overt act need not be independently tortious, but
merely serves an evidentiary purpose, then civil conspiracy may
act as a substantive tort, creating liability for harms done to a
plaintiff, even where the individual actions of the co-conspirators
110
would not give rise to individual liability.
1. The Narrower Theory: A JointLiability Rule
While civil conspiracy developed more readily as a substantive
tort in England, many American courts initially accepted it only as
a rule of joint liability.11 At first blush, this narrower view of civil
conspiracy, requiring commission of a tort by one of the coconspirators might not seem to favor infringement liability for
entities who agree to divide performance of a patent's claimed
steps-in the first hypothetical, neither company individually
108. Thus, while the elements of civil conspiracy remain the basically the
same in each view, different jurisdictions take different view on whether
element (3) of the Halberstam court's definition must be an act which would
independently subject the actor to tort liability.
109. Comment b to the Restatement provision takes this position. "The mere
common plan, design or even express agreement is not enough for liability in
itself, and there must be acts of a tortious character in carrying it into
execution." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a), cmt. B (1979).
110. Several courts take this approach and commentators have argued
strongly that civil conspiracy ought to be a substantive tort. See generally
Leach, supra note 104 (arguing that view of civil conspiracy only as a rule of
joint liability is not meaningfully reasoned but rather based on a string of cases
reaching back to dicta from a 1698 English case); Whitson, supra note 99. "[A]
stand-alone action for civil conspiracy ought to be considered as a means of
sanctioning and preventing types of anti-social behavior that are not sufficiently
addressed by other tort causes of action or statutory schemes." Leach, supra
note 104, at 2-3.
111. Whitson, supra note 99, at 926. The American courts held that "mere
numbers" could not transfer lawful acts into unlawful acts. However, most of
these cases also considered the "goal" of the conspiracy to be lawful itself. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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commits direct infringement. However, the concerns of the
majority of cases that take this narrower view focus on the fact the
defendants had united to achieve what might be considered a
socially improper but otherwise lawful purpose, such as refusing to
deal with a particular business." 2 In the case of entities agreeing
to divide performance of a patented process, the ultimate goal is
not merely improper, but one which would be unlawful if
performed by a single actor.
Moreover, application of the theoretical principle underlying the
rule of joint liability-that the acts of each co-conspirator are
attributable to the other co-conspiratorsl 3-would aggregate
performance of every claimed step in each company that
participated in the common design, allowing each entity to be
found liable as a direct infringer. This principle of vicarious
responsibility for the acts of co-conspirators would fit comfortably
alongside the already judicially accepted "Principal-Agent"
exception to the "Single Actor" rule. Just as principles of
vicarious liability from agency law have been adapted as part of
the judicial interpretation of § 271, so could principles of vicarious
liability from civil conspiracy law be used to "find" direct
infringers who attempt to avoid liability by working in tandem
114
with other entities.
2. The BroaderTheory: A Substantive Tort
The broader view of civil conspiracy as a substantive tort, which
originated in England and is now recognized by several American

112. See id. at 938.
113. Martin H. Pritikin, Toward Coherence in Civil Conspiracy Law: A
Proposal to Abolish the Agent's Immunity Rule, 84 NEB. L. REv. 1, 9 (2005)
("The acts of any one co-conspirator are deemed the acts of all.").
114. The Federal Circuit's approach in the later case of Muniauction v.
Thomson, which interpreted the control or direction standard as primarily based
on traditional concepts of vicarious liability, would seem to support using civil
conspiracy as a basis for finding a direct infringer. Muniauction, Inc. v.
Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing BMC Res., Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh 'g en banc denied,
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4968 (Feb. 11, 2008)), reh'g en banc denied, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25099 (Sept. 25, 2008).
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jurisdictions," 5 even more strongly supports a finding of liability
for entities who agree to divide performance of patented process in
an effort to avoid infringement. The substantive tort of civil
conspiracy finds liability where defendants act according to a
common design or agreement to harm the plaintiff, regardless of
whether their individual actions would be tortious." 6 "A
conspiracy to injure might give rise to civil liability even though
the end was brought about by conduct and acts which by
themselves and apart from the element of combination or
concerted action could not be regarded as a legal wrong."" 7
Even if companies who agree to divide performance of a
claimed method attempt to fall back on the argument that their
individual actions are not against the letter of the law as no direct
infringer can be identified, civil conspiracy as stand-alone tort still
squarely supports imposing liability based on the agreement and
aggregate actions of the parties. The goal of the companies'
agreement in the first hypothetical is to deprive the patentee of the
right to exclude them from practicing the invention. If they
succeed, the patentee has been harmed, to the same degree as if the
invention had been practiced by a single actor. The substantive
tort of civil conspiracy, which looks to the effect of the
defendants' actions in the aggregate, not individually, should be
used analogously in patent law to impose liability for divided
performance.
C. The Tort Law Concept of Combined Nuisance
Cases that find liability for "combined nuisances," or what Dean
Prosser referred to as "[a]cts innocent in themselves which
together cause damage,"". 8 also support liability for the companies
115. See Whitson, supra note 99, at 926. Whitson cites cases from the
United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, Colorado, Florida,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee. Id. at
926, n.44.
116. See id. at 944.
117. Id. at 924 (quoting Quinn v. Leatham, [1901] A.C. 495, 510 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Ir.) (U.K.)).
118. See William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L.
REv. 413, 439-41 (1937) (describing cases where multiple defendants' actions,
in combination, created an actionable nuisance to enjoyment of plaintiffs
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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in either of the introductory hypotheticals" 9 who knowingly divide
performance of the patented process. A rough analogy can be
made between nuisance law and patent law-nuisance law draws a
boundary between neighbors' uses of their respective property to
ensure each can enjoy his own; similarly, the claims of a patent
and the scope of enforcement rights draw a boundary between the
inventor's property and the public domain. In the combined
nuisance cases, while a single defendant's conduct alone would
not have interfered with the plaintiffs property, the combined
effect of multiple defendants' actions harmed the plaintiff and
gave rise to joint liability against each defendant who possessed
knowledge of the other defendant's conduct. 120
As an example, Dean Prosser cites the case of Blair v. Deakin, 2 '
wherein two manufacturers each discharged a chemical into a
water source upstream from the plaintiff.'22 While each chemical
was "harmless" in itself, the combination of the two caused
pollution of the water and interfered with the plaintiffs enjoyment
of his property.'23 In light of the fact that each defendant knew
what the other was doing, each was liable for creating the
Similar reasoning, when applied to the divide
nuisance.124
infringement context, supports liability against entities who
knowingly participate in a scheme to appropriate the commercial
benefit of a patented process. In the first posed hypothetical, both
companies have knowledge of each other's partial performance of
the claimed method based upon their agreement to divide
performance. In the second hypothetical, liability as an infringer
would also be proper for the selling company who knew that its
customers would complete the remaining steps of the claimed

property).
119. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
120. Prosser, supra note 118, at 439-41. "The problem is really one of

whether the privilege to make use of property, or to carry on activities, is
absolute or relative." Id. at 441. Courts imposing liability find that a party is
limited to "reasonable use," which is adjusted based upon the actions of other
neighboring parties. Id.
121. 57 L.T. (N.S.) 522 (1887).
122. Prosser, supra note 118, at 440-41.

123. Id.
124. Id. at441.
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method. 25
'
D. The Patent Law Policy Decision Regarding Divided
Performance
Ultimately, the question of whether to impose liability for
parties who seek to avoid infringement liability merely by dividing
performance of a patented process is a policy decision regarding
the proper scope of patent protection, 2' 6 and the policies at issue
weigh in favor of protecting the rights of patentees in such a
situation. The Federal Circuit itself in BMC v. Paymentech
recognized that it was making a policy decision or, at the least, that
it was balancing various policy "concerns."' 27 Unfortunately, the
court erred in this balancing, allowing a misplaced concern over
"subvert[ing] the statutory scheme for indirect infringement" to
outweigh an undervalued concern for the enforceability of valid
process claims.' 8
Adequately protecting the exclusive rights granted by valid
patents is vital to providing the incentives designed within the
patent system. To echo Judge Rich: "Weaken or destroy the
monopoly and you weaken or destroy the system."' 29 While the
scope of patent rights should be clear and not overly broad, in
order to foster progress of the useful arts, allowing an entity to
escape liability simply by dividing performance in an "arms-length
agreement" with others or by expecting their customers to perform
the final claimed step as a matter of course does not serve the
purposes of the patent law. While the patent system seeks to spur
inventive creativity and motivate competitors to "design-around"
patented inventions, finding "loopholes" in the infringement
scheme is surely not the creativity the Framers or the drafters of
the Patent Acts hoped to promote.
125. Liability should not be imposed, however, against a customer who did
not know or should not reasonably have known of the selling company's
attempt to avoid infringement liability through divided performance.
126. See Bargren, supra note 97, at 454 (noting that questions of joint
liability ultimately boil down to the policy question, "who pays?").
127. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2007), reh 'g en banc denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4968 (Feb. 11, 2008).
128. Id.
129. Rich, supra note 2, at 524.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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The Federal Circuit dismissed the weakening of process patent
rights by stating that the danger could "usually be offset by proper
claims drafting.""13 Clever claims drafting, however, will not be
able to solve all the problems presented by the nature of the
technologies affected by divided claims.'
Furthermore, claims
drafting is of no use to an inventor whose patent is more than two
years old and ineligible for a broadening reissue. 132 The essence of
the court's response to BMC in this regard seemed to be: "You
drafted the claims; it's your problem." ' However, in light of the
existence of non-literal infringement theories, such as the doctrine
of equivalents and even contributory infringement," whose
purpose is to help the patentee overcome the difficulty of
describing a novel invention in written language, a statement that
the court will always construe claims against the patentee rings a
bit hollow.
Finally, the Federal Circuit overestimated the danger to § 271's
statutory scheme that would accompany expanding liability to
some cases of divided performance beyond those covered by the
common law principal-agent scenario of control by one party.
Applying the tort law principles discussed above135 to the
hypotheticals from Part 136 would allow courts to aggregate the
130. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381.
131. The Court admits as much in its use of the word "usually." Id. See
also, Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition for Rehearing en banc at 15, BMC Res., Inc.
v. Paymentech, L.P., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4968 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 11, 2008)
(No. 2006-1503) (suggesting that claims focusing on one party would be
unworkable for serial processes involving acts by three or more entities).
132. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 278-279 (noting that, although an issue of
first impression, altering claims from "divided" to "unitary" likely qualifies as a
broadening reissue under 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006)).
133. "[T]his court will not unilaterally restructure the claim or the standards
for joint infringement to remedy these ill-conceived claims." BMC, 498 F.3d at
1381.
134. Rich, supra note 2, at 527-28. Judge Rich describes the first known
contributory infringement case of Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74, 100
(C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17), wherein the patent "monopoly was not extended
beyond the invention, though it was extended beyond the strict verbal
limitations of the claim, as it had to be in order to protect the invention." Rich,
supra note 2, at 528.
135. See supra Part IV.A-C.
136. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
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actions of several entities to find that each and every step of the
claimed method had, in fact, been performed and to hold the
culpable companies liable for direct infringement. Applying such
rules of vicarious responsibility for the acts of others in these
circumstances would no more subvert the indirect infringement
provisions than current application of the "Principal-Agent"
exception to the "Single Actor" rule does. Rather, allowing
broader exceptions to the "Single Actor" rule, where appropriate,
would serve merely to create direct infringement liability where
none currently exists; indirect infringement could still play a
proper role. Where a patentee holds a valid patent, but one with
claims covering a process performed by multiple entities, the law
ought to afford a remedy against entities who seek to practice the
invention but avoid liability by simply dividing performance.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF DIVIDED PERFORMANCE

Providing adequate protection to inventors of processes which,
despite being patentable, are subject to divided performance and
thereby often rendered unenforceable by the current law of patent
infringement must occur to protect the incentives the patent system
was designed to implement. Recognition of liability for entities
who divide performance could be implemented either by the courts
or by Congress. Initially, the Federal Circuit, in appropriate cases,
might reconsider its relatively strict application of "Single Actor"
rule in BMC v. Paymentech and reshape infringement
jurisprudence to ensure the continued promotion of businesses
holding or seeking process patents potentially rendered valueless
by divided performance. Alternatively, Congress may be best
equipped to provide a clear solution which appropriately balances
competing policies through statutory amendment.
If the courts desire to close the "loophole" afforded to artful
competitors by the current infringement regime and to protect the
rights of patentees holding valid process claims, the Federal
Circuit might still do so."' Although the most natural reading of
BMC v. Paymentech is that common law principal-agent
137. Of course, the Supreme Court might also view liability for divided
performance by multiple entities differently than the Federal Circuit did in BMC
v. Paymentech, if certiorari were granted in an appropriate case.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/3
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relationships or situations where one "mastermind" party controls
the infringement provide the only proper exception to the "Single
Actor" rule,'38 the court in future cases could engage in a more
liberal reading of the case and decide that other, broader
exceptions covering divided performance were not foreclosed. 39
Alternatively, as the court's discussion of the "proper standard for
joint infringement by multiple parties of a single claim" 4 ° was
arguably unneeded to decide the case since, according to the
district court, BMC had not sufficiently shown a "connection"
between Paymentech and some of its affiliates, 4 ' the Federal
Circuit, in a future case presenting a divided performance issue,
might limit the holding of BMC v. Paymentech to its facts and
distinguish the case.
However the Federal Circuit deals with the BMC v. Paymentech
precedent, when next presented with a case where an entity has
divided performance in a manner similar to either of the
hypothetical scenarios from Part I,142 the court should take the
opportunity to recognize that aggregating the actions of the parties
is appropriate to impose liability for direct infringement and
prevent the culpable entity or entities from using the patented
process without repercussion. The courts have already recognized
that imposing liability for direct infringement on an entity who
performed less than the entire claimed method is appropriate based
on vicarious responsibility where the parties have a principal-agent
relationship. 43
General principles of tort law also support
vicarious responsibility for the acts of others in broader contexts,'4 4
and the Federal Circuit could readily acknowledge broader
138. See supra Part II.C.
139. The Federal Circuit's analysis in Muniauction generally equating the
control or direction standard with traditional vicarious liability principles may

provide a platform for an appropriate future case to take a more expansive view
of liability for divided performance. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,
532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25099 (Sept. 25, 2008).
140. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1375, 1378.
141. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Veeraraghavan,

supra note 49, at 231-32.
142. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.

143. See supra Part II.B.
144. See supra Part IV.A-C.
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exceptions to the "Single Actor" rule.
While the federal courts have occasionally expanded the scope
of protection beyond the express terms of a statute where
necessary to properly protect the holder of an intellectual property
right,1 45 they have also sometimes hesitated to read the
infringement provisions of the Patent Act broadly in fear of
judicially expanding liability under § 271 farther than Congress
actually intended. In the context of exporting components of a
patented machine, this caution can be observed in Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. 6 and, more recently, Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp.147 It is a fair presumption that this concern
of the federal courts generally, and the Supreme Court particularly,
influenced the decision of the Federal Circuit in BMC v.
Paymentech not to take a more expansive view of direct
infringement which would cover divided performance of a process
by multiple entities. In light of this reality, Congress may need to
provide protection against divided performance through statutory
amendment.
If the decision to promote protection of patented processes and
to impose liability upon entities who seek to avoid infringement by
simply dividing performance is ultimately a policy choice,
Congress may be best equipped to make such a legislative
decision. Congress could intervene, as it has done in the past for
other forms of infringement,148 and amend the Patent Act to
expressly provide direct infringement liability based on aggregate
14

145. Examples include the judicial developments of the doctrine of
equivalents and of indirect infringement. See generally Chisum, supra note 1;
Rich, supra note 2; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (discussing non-statutory liability for indirect
infringement of copyright).
146. 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) ("[T]he sign of how far Congress has chosen
to go can come only from Congress."). "We would require a clear and certain
signal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who... argues
that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower,
than courts had previously thought." Id. at 531.
147. 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1759 (2007) ("[W]e are not persuaded that dynamic
judicial interpretation of § 271(0 is in order [to close a potential 'loophole'].
The 'loophole,' in our judgment, is properly left for Congress to consider, and to
close if it finds such action warranted.").
148. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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performance of an entire claimed method for entities such as the
companies described in the introductory hypotheticals.' 49 While
passing a statutory amendment through Congress is no small feat,
§ 271 has already been amended many times in the past 25
years. 51 If the impact of weakened protection for process patents
covering computer network operations or e-business methods turns
out to be significant, 51 several major players from those industries
may desire to help "shepherd" such an amendment through
Congress. In the end, statutory amendment may provide the
clearest approach if the courts remain hesitant to judicially expand
liability.
VI. CONCLUSION

A patentee who has invested time, effort, and money into
developing and patenting a useful, novel, and nonobvious process
deserves more than a worthless piece of paper with claims
effectively unenforceable in court-this is the promise of the U.S.
patent system. Yet, for method claims comprised of steps which
encompass the actions of multiple entities or whose performance is
easily divisible between multiple entities, a piece of paper is all the
inventor will be left with under the current law of infringement
when artful competitors divide performance of the process.
Liability ought to be imposed against such defendants, and the
state of the law after BMC v. Paymentech needs to be
reconsidered. General tort law policies of protecting property
owners against intentional infliction of harm, as well as specific
tort doctrines of vicarious responsibility for the acts of others
strongly support imposition of liability. Finally, patent law
policies favor protecting valid process patents and preventing
entities from exploiting technicalities in the law to deprive the
patentee of the commercial benefit of his invention.
-Joshua P. Larsen
149.
150.
151.
BMC v.
152.

5

See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
See Gerdelman, supra note 4, at 1993-2003.
See supra note 9 (discussing the impact of divided performance and the
Paymentech decision on these industries).
Juris Doctor, 2008, DePaul University College of Law. The author
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